Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Collateral Crises

Contents:

Author Info

  • Guillermo Ordonez

    (Yale University)

  • Gary Gorton

    (Yale University)

Abstract

Short-term, collateralized, debt is efficient if agents are willing to lend without producing costly information about the value of the collateral. When the economy relies on this informationally-insensitive debt, information is not renewed over time. If the value of collateral is mean reverting, there is a credit boom when firms with bad collateral start borrowing as the information about their collateral depreciates. The longer an economy remains in an information-insensitive regime, the smaller the fraction of collateral with information about their true value, and the larger the fraction of collateral that look similar. This creates fragility, since a small aggregate shock to collateral values is more likely to generate a large systemic collapse in output and consumption. Furthermore, if a crisis triggers information production, the economy takes longer to recover.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2011/paper_569.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2011 Meeting Papers with number 569.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:red:sed011:569

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Fax: 1-314-444-8731
Email:
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Lagunoff, Roger & Schreft, Stacey L, 1999. "Financial Fragility with Rational And Irrational Exuberance," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(3), pages 531-60, August.
  2. Reinhart, Carmen & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2009. "Banking Crises: An Equal Opportunity Menace," CEPR Discussion Papers 7131, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. William N. Goetzmann & ROGER G. IBBOTSON & LIANG PENG, 2004. "A New Historical Database For The NYSE 1815 To 1925: Performance And Predictability," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm5, Yale School of Management.
  4. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
  5. David Andolfatto, 2011. "Undue Diligence," 2011 Meeting Papers 994, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  6. Enrique G. Mendoza & Marco E. Terrones, 2008. "An anatomy of credit booms: evidence from macro aggregates and micro data," International Finance Discussion Papers 936, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  7. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 8973.
  8. Guillermo Ordonez, 2008. "Fragility of Reputation and Clustering in Risk Taking," 2008 Meeting Papers 441, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. Javier Bianchi, 2010. "Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle," 2010 Meeting Papers 96, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  10. David Andolfatto, 2010. "On the social cost of transparency in monetary economies," Working Papers 2010-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  11. Fabian Valencia & Luc Laeven, 2008. "Systemic Banking Crises," IMF Working Papers 08/224, International Monetary Fund.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Fabrizio Perri & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2011. "International recessions," Staff Report 463, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  2. Pablo Kurlat & Laura Veldkamp, 2012. "Should We Regulate Financial Information," Working Papers 12-15, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  3. Manmohan Singh & Peter Stella, 2012. "Money and Collateral," IMF Working Papers 12/95, International Monetary Fund.
  4. Farhi, Emmanuel & Tirole, Jean, 2012. "Liquid Bundles," TSE Working Papers 12-328, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Oct 2013.
  5. Helios Herrera & Guillermo Ordoñez & Christoph Trebesch, 2014. "Political Booms, Financial Crises," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  6. Itay Goldstein & Assaf Razin, 2013. "Three Branches of Theories of Financial Crises," NBER Working Papers 18670, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. repec:fip:fedreq:y:2011:i:3q:p:209-254:n:vol.97no.3 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Helios Herrera & Guillermo Ordoñez & Christoph Trebesch, 2014. "Political Booms, Financial Crises," NBER Working Papers 20346, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed011:569. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.