Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Strategic Relationships in Over-the-Counter Markets

Contents:

Author Info

  • Ana Babus

    (Princeton University)

Abstract

This paper provides a theory of dynamic formation of relationships in over-the-counter markets. I show that in equilibrium markets are dealer-centric. Two forces drive the formation of networks of relationships that have a core-periphery structure. First, agents develop enduring relationships to trade risky assets over the counter against no collateral. Unsecured trading is feasible when traders are willing to incur losses in the bad states of the world, provided they are compensated sufficiently in the good states of the world. To enforce such contracts, traders rely on a network of relationships. Second, in a network, some agents may need to intermediate transactions between others and require compensation for it. This explains the emergence of a central broker-dealer that stands as counterparty for all trade.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2011/paper_1405.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2011 Meeting Papers with number 1405.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:red:sed011:1405

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Fax: 1-314-444-8731
Email:
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Bhaskar Dutta & Sayantan Ghosal & Debraj Ray, 2004. "Farsighted Network Formation," Working papers 122, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  2. Paolo Colla & Antonio Mele, 2010. "Information Linkages and Correlated Trading," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(1), pages 203-246, January.
  3. Upper, Christian & Worms, Andreas, 2002. "Estimating Bilateral Exposures in the German Interbank Market: Is there a Danger of Contagion?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2002,09, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  4. Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Matthew O. Jackson & Francis Bloch, 2004. "The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players," Working Papers 2004.80, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  6. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
  7. Dmitrios Vayanos, 2004. "Search and Endogenous Concentration of Liquidity in Asset Markets," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 647, Econometric Society.
  8. Acharya, Viral V. & Pedersen, Lasse Heje, 2005. "Asset pricing with liquidity risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 375-410, August.
  9. Jonathan Levin, 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June.
  10. Darrell Duffie & Nicolae Gârleanu & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2007. "Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(6), pages 1865-1900, November.
  11. Franklin Allen & Ana Babus & Elena Carletti, 2010. "Financial Connections and Systemic Risk," NBER Chapters, in: Market Institutions and Financial Market Risk National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. John Moore & Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, . "Credit Cycles," Discussion Papers 1995-5, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  13. Michi Kandori, 2010. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Levine's Working Paper Archive 630, David K. Levine.
  14. Yaron Leitner, 2005. "Financial Networks: Contagion, Commitment, and Private Sector Bailouts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(6), pages 2925-2953, December.
  15. Dan Bernhardt & Vladimir Dvoracek & Eric Hughson & Ingrid M. Werner, 2005. "Why Do Larger Orders Receive Discounts on the London Stock Exchange?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(4), pages 1343-1368.
  16. Ozsoylev, Han N. & Walden, Johan, 2011. "Asset pricing in large information networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2252-2280.
  17. Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2007. "Structural holes in social networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 460-492, November.
  18. Cocco, João F. & Gomes, Francisco J. & Martins, Nuno C., 2009. "Lending relationships in the interbank market," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 24-48, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Bräuning, Falk & Fecht, Falko, 2012. "Relationship lending in the interbank market and the price of liquidity," Discussion Papers 22/2012, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  2. Jan-Peter Siedlarek, 2012. "Intermediation in Networks," Working Papers 2012.42, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed011:1405. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.