Financial Connections and Systemic Risk
AbstractAn important source of systemic risk is overlapping portfolio exposures among financial institutions. We develop a model where institutions form connections through swaps of projects in order to diversify their individual risk. These connections lead to two different network structures. In a clustered network groups of financial institutions within a cluster hold identical portfolios. Defaults occur together but the number of states where this happens is small. In an unclustered network defaults are more dispersed but they occur in more states. With long term finance there is no difference between the two structures in terms of total defaults and welfare. In contrast, when short term finance is used, the network structure matters. Upon the arrival of a signal about banks' future defaults, investors update their expectations of the ability of financial institutions to repay them. If their updated expectations are low, they do not to roll over the debt and there is systemic risk in that all institutions are early liquidated. We compare the clustered and unclustered networks and analyze which is better in welfare terms.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European University Institute in its series Economics Working Papers with number ECO2010/26.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Badia Fiesolana, Via dei Roccettini, 9, 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy
Web page: http://www.eui.eu/ECO/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Franklin Allen & Ana Babus & Elena Carletti, 2010. "Financial Connections and Systemic Risk," Economics Working Papers ECO2010/30, European University Institute.
- Franklin Allen & Ana Babus & Elena Carletti, 2010. "Financial Connections and Systemic Risk," NBER Working Papers 16177, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Allen, F. & Babus, A. & Carletti, E., 2010. "Financial Connections and Systemic Risk," Discussion Paper 2010-88S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Allen, Franklin & Babus, Ana & Carletti, Elena, 2010. "Financial Connections and Systemic Risk," Working Papers 10-20, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2010-06-04 (Banking)
- NEP-NET-2010-06-04 (Network Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Freixas, Xavier & Parigi, Bruno M & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2000.
"Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 611-38, August.
- Xavier Freixas & Bruno M. Parigi & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2000. "Systemic risk, interbank relations, and liquidity provision by the central bank," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 611-640.
- Freixas, Xavier & Parigi, Bruno & Rochet, Jean Charles, 1999. "Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank," CEPR Discussion Papers 2325, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Xavier Freixas & Bruno Parigi & Jean Charles Rochet, 1998. "Systemic risk, interbank relations and liquidity provision by the Central Bank," Economics Working Papers 440, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 1999.
- X. Freixas & B. Parigi & J-C. Rochet, 2000. "Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations and Liquidity Provision by theCentral Bank," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 47, Netherlands Central Bank.
- Wagner, Wolf, 2010.
"Diversification at financial institutions and systemic crises,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 373-386, July.
- Wagner, W.B., 2006. "Diversification at Financial Institutions and Systemic Crises," Discussion Paper 2006-71, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Franklin Allen & Ana Babus & Elena Carletti, 2009. "Financial Crises: Theory and Evidence," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 97-116, November.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2001.
"Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 287-327, April.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1998. "Liquidity risk, liquidity creation and financial fragility: a theory of banking," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Sep.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1999. "Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking," NBER Working Papers 7430, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, . "Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking," CRSP working papers 476, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
- Nicole M. Boyson & Christof W. Stahel & Rene M. Stulz, 2008.
"Hedge Fund Contagion and Liquidity,"
NBER Working Papers
14068, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996.
"A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Richard J. Herring & Susan Wachter, 1999. "Real Estate Booms and Banking Busts: An International Perspective," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 99-27, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 8973.
- Flannery, Mark J, 1986. " Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(1), pages 19-37, March.
- Calomiris, Charles W & Kahn, Charles M, 1991. "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 497-513, June.
- Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(3), pages 709-37, August.
- Castiglionesi, F. & Navarro, N., 2007. "Optimal Fragile Financial Networks," Discussion Paper 2007-100, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marcia Gastaldo).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.