Modern banking systems are highly interconnected. Despite their various benefits, the linkages that exist between banks carry the risk of contagion. In this paper we investigate how banks decide on direct balance sheet linkages and the implications for contagion risk. In particular, we model a network formation process in the banking system. Banks form links order to reduce the risk of contagion. The network is formed endogenously and serves as an insurance mechanism. We show that banks manage to form networks that are resilient to contagion. Thus, in an equilibrium network, the probability of contagion is virtually 0.
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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number
2007.69.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
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Bhaskar Dutta & Sayantan Ghosal & Debraj Ray, 2004.
"Farsighted Network Formation,"
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122, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
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Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993.
"Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
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