Does aversion to the sucker's payoff matter in public goods games?
AbstractA usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an assurance against getting the sucker’s payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective’ design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by INRA UMR SMART in its series Working Papers SMART - LERECO with number 09-08.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 4, Allée Adolphe Bobierre, CS 61103, 35011 Rennes Cedex
Web page: http://www.rennes.inra.fr/smart_eng/Working-Papers-SMART-LERECO
More information through EDIRC
Experiments; Public good; Sucker’s payoff; Assurance;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-03-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-03-22 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2009-03-22 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-03-22 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2009-03-22 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2009-03-22 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cason, T.N. & Gangadharan, L., 1999.
"Environmental Labeling and Incomplete Consumer Information in Laboratory Markets,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
708, The University of Melbourne.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata, 2002. "Environmental Labeling and Incomplete Consumer Information in Laboratory Markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 113-134, January.
- Rachel T. A. Croson, 2007. "Theories Of Commitment, Altruism And Reciprocity: Evidence From Linear Public Goods Games," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(2), pages 199-216, 04.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne Chauvel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.