Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Dealing with aversion to the sucker's payoff in public goods games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Douadia Bougherara

    ()
    (INRA, UMR1302, F-35000 Rennes, France)

  • Sandrine Costa

    ()
    (INRA-ENGREF, UMR0356, F-54000 Nancy, France)

  • Gilles Grolleau

    ()
    (INRA-SUPAGRO, UMR1135, F-34000 Montpellier, France)

  • Lisette Ibanez

    ()
    (INRA, UMR1135, F-34000 Montpellier, France)

Abstract

A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker's payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an insurance against getting the sucker's payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective' design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2009/Volume29/EB-09-V29-I4-P309.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 3194-3202

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00730

Contact details of provider:

Related research

Keywords: Experiments; Public good; Sucker's payoff; Assurance;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata, 2002. "Environmental Labeling and Incomplete Consumer Information in Laboratory Markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 113-134, January.
  2. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
  3. John List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2002. "The effects of seed money and refunds on charitable giving: Experimental evidence from a university capital campaign," Natural Field Experiments 00301, The Field Experiments Website.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00730. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.