How to take an exam if you must: Decision under Deadline
AbstractThis paper uses the example of an exam to model multi-dimensional search under a deadline. When the dimension is two, an order-invariance property allows simple characterization of the optimal search policy. Behavior is shown to be highly sensitive to changes in the deadline, and a wide variety of policies can be rationalized (as being optimal) as the length of the deadline increases. This is contrasted with behavior under the traditional case of geometric discounting, in which a similar sensitivity to changes in the discount factor cannot hold. For dimensions higher than two, the invariance principle does not hold; this increases complexity of the problem of finding the optimal search policy.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1119.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2006
Date of revision:
Deadline; search; invariance;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-10 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 1999.
"Incentives For Procrastinators,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 769-816, August.
- Ching-to Albert Ma & Michael Manove, 1991.
"Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control,"
0007, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Ma, Ching-To Albert & Manove, Michael, 1993. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1313-39, November.
- Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993. "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 306-321, August.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Babcock).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.