This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The beauty of "bigness" in contest design: merging or splitting?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Fu, Qiang
Lu, Jingfeng

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper studies in a multiple-winner contest setting how the total efforts may vary between a grand contest and a set of subcontests. We first show that the rent-dissipation rate increases when the numbers of contestants and prizes are "scaled up". In other words, the total efforts of a contest exhibit a striking "increasing return to scale" property: when the numbers of contestants and prizes scale up proportionally, the total efforts of the contest increase more than proportionally. Thus, the total efforts must increase when a set of identical subcontests are merged into a grand contest. Equivalently, the total efforts decrease when a grand contest is evenly divided. We further allow the grand contest to be split into uneven subcontests. We show that under a mild and plausible condition (regular contest technology), the grand contest generates more efforts as compared to any split contests.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/947/
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 947.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:947

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

Related research
Keywords: Contests Multiple-winners Efforts Size Replication.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Clark, Derek J. & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Influence and the discretionary allocation of several prizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 605-625, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Amegashie, J Atsu, 2000. " Some Results on Rent-Seeking Contests with Shortlisting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(3-4), pages 245-53, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Warneryd, Karl, 2001. "Replicating contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 323-327, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Warneryd, Karl, 1998. "Distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 435-450, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
  6. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2002. "Contest Architecture," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 02-06, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Barut, Yasar & Kovenock, Dan, 1998. "The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 627-644, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Yates, Andrew J. & Heckelman, Jac C., 2001. "Rent-setting in multiple winner rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 835-852, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1996. " A Multi-winner Nested Rent-Seeking Contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 177-84, April.
  10. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
  11. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-89, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Inderst, Roman & Müller, Holger M. & Wärneryd, Karl, 2000. "Influence Costs and Hierarchy," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 00-30, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All bibliographic data on IDEAS has been put in the public domain by the publishers.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-9.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.