IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/89836.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Is Nepotism Inevitable Under Search and Matching Friction?

Author

Listed:
  • Mazumder, Debojyoti
  • Biswas, Rajit

Abstract

The present article develops a search and matching framework to model political nepotism in the job market. The model argues that labor market friction generates incentives for the political leaders to provide nepotism under a democratic set up. Both the leaders optimally choose nepotism when the labor market friction is higher. It is shown that even for a relatively lesser labor market friction at least one leader would always choose nepotism. The results of the basic model remain robust in an extension where followers can pay a price and choose their allegiance, to any one of the political parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Mazumder, Debojyoti & Biswas, Rajit, 2018. "Is Nepotism Inevitable Under Search and Matching Friction?," MPRA Paper 89836, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:89836
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/89836/1/MPRA_paper_89836.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yannis M. Ioannides & Linda Datcher Loury, 2004. "Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects, and Inequality," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1056-1093, December.
    2. Fontaine, Francois, 2007. "A simple matching model with social networks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(3), pages 396-401, March.
    3. Charlot, Olivier & Decreuse, Bruno, 2005. "Self-selection in education with matching frictions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 251-267, April.
    4. Andrea Galeotti & Luca Paolo Merlino, 2014. "Endogenous Job Contact Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(4), pages 1201-1226, November.
    5. Rueda, David, 2006. "Social Democracy and Active Labour-Market Policies: Insiders, Outsiders and the Politics of Employment Promotion," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 385-406, July.
    6. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262161877, December.
    7. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Edward Miguel & Daniel Ortega & Francisco Rodriguez, 2011. "The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 196-214, April.
    8. Semih Tumen, 2016. "Informal versus formal search: Which yields better pay?," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 257-277, September.
    9. Samuel Bentolila & Claudio Michelacci & Javier Suarez, 2010. "Social Contacts and Occupational Choice," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 77(305), pages 20-45, January.
    10. Marcel Fafchamps & Julien Labonne, 2017. "Do Politicians’ Relatives Get Better Jobs? Evidence from Municipal Elections," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 268-300.
    11. Rueda, David, 2005. "Insider–Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social Democratic Parties," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(1), pages 61-74, February.
    12. Andrea Galeotti & Luca Paolo Merlino, 2014. "Endogenous Job Contact Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 1201-1226, November.
    13. Sam Asher & Paul Novosad, 2017. "Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 229-273, January.
    14. Margaret Stevens, 2007. "New Microfoundations For The Aggregate Matching Function," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 847-868, August.
    15. Simon, Curtis J & Warner, John T, 1992. "Matchmaker, Matchmaker: The Effect of Old Boy Networks on Job Match Quality, Earnings, and Tenure," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 10(3), pages 306-330, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stupnytska, Yuliia & Zaharieva, Anna, 2015. "Explaining U-shape of the referral hiring pattern in a search model with heterogeneous workers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 211-233.
    2. Fontaine, François, 2008. "Why are similar workers paid differently? the role of social networks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(12), pages 3960-3977, December.
    3. Zaharieva, Anna, 2013. "Social welfare and wage inequality in search equilibrium with personal contacts," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 107-121.
    4. Vincent Boucher & Marion Gousse, 2019. "Wage Dynamics and Peer Referrals," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 31, pages 1-23, January.
    5. Cappellari, Lorenzo & Tatsiramos, Konstantinos, 2015. "With a little help from my friends? Quality of social networks, job finding and job match quality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 55-75.
    6. Yoshitaka Ogisu, 2022. "Referral Hiring and Social Network Structure," Papers 2201.06020, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
    7. Vincent Boucher & Marion Gousse, 2019. "Wage Dynamics and Peer Referrals," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 31, pages 1-23, January.
    8. Martina Rebien & Michael Stops & Anna Zaharieva, 2020. "Formal Search And Referrals From A Firm'S Perspective," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(4), pages 1679-1748, November.
    9. Manolis Galenianos, 2016. "Referral networks and inequality," 2016 Meeting Papers 1173, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Dariel, Aurelie & Riedl, Arno & Siegenthaler, Simon, 2021. "Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 109-130.
    11. Yves Zenou, 2015. "A Dynamic Model of Weak and Strong Ties in the Labor Market," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(4), pages 891-932.
    12. Andrea Galeotti & Luca Paolo Merlino, 2014. "Endogenous Job Contact Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(4), pages 1201-1226, November.
    13. Marcelo Arbex & Dennis O'Dea & David Wiczer, 2019. "Network Search: Climbing The Job Ladder Faster," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(2), pages 693-720, May.
    14. Semih Tumen, 2016. "Informal versus formal search: Which yields better pay?," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 257-277, September.
    15. Andrea Morescalchi, 2021. "A new career in a new town. Job search methods and regional mobility of unemployed workers," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 20(2), pages 223-272, May.
    16. Merlino, Luca Paolo, 2014. "Formal and informal job search," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 350-352.
    17. Benjamin Lester & David A. Rivers & Giorgio Topa, 2021. "The Heterogeneous Impact of Referrals on Labor Market Outcomes," Working Papers 21-34, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    18. Ioannides, Yannis M., 2018. "A DMP model of intercity trade," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 97-111.
    19. Arbex, Marcelo & Caetano, Sidney & O’Dea, Dennis, 2016. "The implications of labor market network for business cycles," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 37-40.
    20. Axtell, Robert L. & Guerrero, Omar A. & López, Eduardo, 2019. "Frictional unemployment on labor flow networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 184-201.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    search and matching; nepotism; political regime change;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:89836. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.