This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Venture Capitalists, Asymmetric Information and Ownership in the Innovation Process Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Fabrizi, Simona
Lippert, Steffen
Norback, Pehr-Johan
Persson, Lars
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
This paper constructs a model where entrepreneurial innovations are sold into oligopolistic industries and where adverse selection problems between entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and incumbents are present. We first show that aggressive development of a basic innovation by better informed venture-backed firms is used as a signaling device to enhance the sale price of the innovation. We then show that incumbents can undertake early, preemptive, acquisitions to prevent such signaling driven overinvestment, despite the risk of buying a non-productive innovation. Therefore, to exist in equilibrium, venture capitalists must be sufficiently more efficient in selecting innovation projects, otherwise preemptive acquisitions will take place.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
6265.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML ,
plain text ,
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 15 Nov 2007Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6265Contact details of provider: Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219 Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900 Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
Keywords: venture-backed firm innovation signaling overinvestment interim development M&A Find related papers by JEL classification: D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage O3 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
This item is featured on the following reading lists :
Technology Assessment
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Joshua S. Gans & David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, 2007.
"The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market For Ideas: Evidence From Patent Grant Delays ,"
NBER Working Papers
13234, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Joshua S. Cans & Scott Stern, 2000.
"Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative Destruction ,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(4), pages 485-511, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Keuschnigg, Christian & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2004.
"Start-ups, venture capitalists, and the capital gains tax ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 88(5), pages 1011-1042, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Keuschnigg, Christian & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2002.
"Start-ups, Venture Capitalists and the Capital Gains Tax ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Bo Nielsen, 2002.
"Start-ups, Venture Capitalists, and the Capital Gains Tax ,"
University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002
2002-05, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
[Downloadable!] Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Bo Nielsen, 2002.
"Start-ups, Venture Capitalits, and the Capital Gains Tax ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH.
[Downloadable!] Hellmann, Thomas, 2002.
"A theory of strategic venture investing ,"
Journal of Financial Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 285-314, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, 2001.
"The Venture Capital Revolution ,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives ,
American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 145-168, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Thomas Hellmann & Manju Puri, 2002.
"Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-Up Firms: Empirical Evidence ,"
Journal of Finance ,
American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 169-197, 02.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cochrane, John H., 2005.
"The risk and return of venture capital ,"
Journal of Financial Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 3-52, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1994.
"Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 190-209, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cumming, Douglas J. & MacIntosh, Jeffrey G., 2003.
"A cross-country comparison of full and partial venture capital exits ,"
Journal of Banking & Finance ,
Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 511-548, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, 2000.
"Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 674-692, Winter.
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2004.
"The Organization of the Innovation Industry: Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists, and Oligopolists ,"
Working Paper Series
626, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Teece, David J., 1986.
"Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy ,"
Research Policy ,
Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 285-305, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hellmann, Thomas, 2006.
"IPOs, acquisitions, and the use of convertible securities in venture capital ,"
Journal of Financial Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 649-679, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hellmann, Thomas & Puri, Manju, 2000.
"The Interaction between Product Market and Financing Strategy: The Role of Venture Capital ,"
Review of Financial Studies ,
Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(4), pages 959-84.
Gans, Joshua S. & Stern, Scott, 2003.
"The product market and the market for "ideas": commercialization strategies for technology entrepreneurs ,"
Research Policy ,
Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 333-350, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Granstrand, Ove & Sjolander, Soren, 1990.
"The acquisition of technology and small firms by large firms ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 367-386, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Joshua S. Gans & David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, 2000.
"When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction? ,"
NBER Working Papers
7851, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2001.
"Venture Capitals As Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 426-430, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Engel, Dirk & Keilbach, Max, 2007.
"Firm-level implications of early stage venture capital investment -- An empirical investigation ,"
Journal of Empirical Finance ,
Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 150-167, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Engel, Dirk & Keilbach, Max, 2002.
"Firm Level Implications of Early Stage Venture Capital Investment : An Empirical Investigation ,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
02-82, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
[Downloadable!] Max Keilbach & Dirk Engel, .
"Firm Level Implications of Early Stage Venture Capital Investment - An Empiri cal Investigation ,"
Discussion Papers on Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy
2005-22, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Group for Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy.
[Downloadable!] Bianchi, Milo & Henrekson, Magnus, 2005.
"Is Neoclassical Economics still Entrepreneurless? ,"
Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
584, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 02 Feb 2005.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Full
references
Access and
download statistics Did you know? IDEAS also indexes software components .
This page was last updated on 2008-11-17.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .