A Partner in Crime: Assortative Matching and Bias in the Crime Market
AbstractIn this paper I analyze partnership formation within the property crime market in the United States. I develop a static matching model, in which a criminal forms a partnership with a counterpart with the same probability of success. Using individual arrest data from the National Incident Based Reporting System, I pinpoint matches where the underlying ability of two partners differ. This difference in ability is correlated to observable characteristics, making the case for discrimination. By comparing the regression results to success means for the same demographic groups, I find patterns consistent with discrimination. Beside the patterns of gender and racial segregation, I find that in white-black matches, blacks outperform whites, consistent with success means. In male-female matches the female's success realization is higher than the male's, contrary to the difference in success means, where males on average outperform females, hinting at a distaste premium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 50432.
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2013
Date of revision:
Assortative Matching; Bias; Crime; Discrimination; Organized Crime;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEM-2013-10-11 (Demographic Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-10-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAW-2013-10-11 (Law & Economics)
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