The Effect of External Incentives on Profits and Firm-Provided Incentives Strategy
AbstractThe article examines the firm's choice of incentives when workers face additional incentives (“external incentives”) to those provided by the firm, such as building reputation that improves the workers' prospects with other employers, or satisfaction from working well. Surprisingly, the firm might find it optimal to increase the incentives it provides following an increase in external incentives. Even if the firm reduces its incentives, however, total incentives unambiguously increase, leading to higher effort and profits. This implies that firms should try to increase the external incentives that their workers face; I suggest several ways firms can do so.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 4456.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision: 2007
Worker satisfaction; Personnel economics; External incentives; Worker reputation; Intrinsic motivation;
Other versions of this item:
- Azar, Ofer H., 2008. "The effect of external incentives on profits and firm-provided incentives strategy," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 149-156, February.
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- M20 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-08-18 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CBE-2007-08-18 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
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