Assessing the Impact of Deterrence on Road Safety due to the Demerit Point System
AbstractThis paper assesses the impact of a decrease in demerit points on the probability of traffic violation. To address the inherent heterogeneity of drivers, I use the expiration process of points to compare the behaviour of similar drivers with different demerit points. I find that a 3-point decrease in the number of demerit points only has an impact for drivers close to the limit, but increases their probability of violation by 50 to 80 percent.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 39439.
Date of creation: Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Demerit point system; deterrence; driving; road safety; traffic violation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2012-06-25 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-TRE-2012-06-25 (Transport Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Georges Dionne & Jean Pinquet & Mathieu Maurice & Charles Vanasse, 2011.
"Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 93(1), pages 218-227, February.
- Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Mathieu Maurice, 2009. "Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data," Working Papers hal-00414479, HAL.
- Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Maurice Mathieu, 2011. "Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data," Post-Print hal-00567866, HAL.
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