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Assessing the Impact of Deterrence on Road Safety due to the Demerit Point System

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  • Chandler, Vincent

Abstract

This paper assesses the impact of a decrease in demerit points on the probability of traffic violation. To address the inherent heterogeneity of drivers, I use the expiration process of points to compare the behaviour of similar drivers with different demerit points. I find that a 3-point decrease in the number of demerit points only has an impact for drivers close to the limit, but increases their probability of violation by 50 to 80 percent.

Suggested Citation

  • Chandler, Vincent, 2012. "Assessing the Impact of Deterrence on Road Safety due to the Demerit Point System," MPRA Paper 39439, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:39439
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39439/1/MPRA_paper_39439.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Picard, Pierre, 2007. "Point-record driving licence and road safety: An economic approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 235-258, February.
    2. Georges Dionne & Jean Pinquet & Mathieu Maurice & Charles Vanasse, 2011. "Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(1), pages 218-227, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Demerit point system; deterrence; driving; road safety; traffic violation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities

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