A framework of coopetitive games:applications to the Greek crisis
AbstractIn the present work we propose an original analytical model of coopetitive game. We shall apply this analytical model of coopetition (based on normal form game theory) to the Greek crisis, while conceiving this game theory model at a macro level. We construct two realizations of such model, trying to represent possible realistic macro-economic scenarios of the Germany-Greek strategic interaction. We shall suggest - after a deep and complete study of the two samples - feasible transferable utility solutions in a properly coopetitive perspective for the divergent interests which drive the economic policies in the euro area.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37855.
Date of creation: Mar 2012
Date of revision:
Euro area; macroeconomc policy; competition; cooperation; coopetition; normal form games games;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
- F40 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
- O52 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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