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Abstract

In the present work we propose an original analytical model of coopetitive game. We try to apply this analytical model of coopetition - based on game theory and conceived at a macro level - to the Greek crisis, suggesting feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective for the divergent interests which drive the economic policies in the euro area.

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File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1106.3543
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by arXiv.org in its series Papers with number 1106.3543.

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Date of creation: Jun 2011
Date of revision: Sep 2011
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1106.3543

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Web page: http://arxiv.org/

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
• B22 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Macroeconomics
• C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2011-06-25 (All new papers)
• NEP-GTH-2011-06-25 (Game Theory)

References

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1. Schilirò, Daniele, 2011. "A new governance for the EMU and the economic policy framework," MPRA Paper 32235, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jul 2011.
   
   • Schilirò, Daniele, 2011. "A new governance for the EMU and the economic policy framework," MPRA Paper 30237, University Library of Munich, Germany.
2. Olivier Blanchard & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Paolo Mauro, 2010. "Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(s1), pages 199-215, 09.
   
   • Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Olivier J. Blanchard & Paolo Mauro, 2010. "Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy," IMF Staff Position Notes 2010/03, International Monetary Fund.
3. Daniele Schilirò, 2008. "Investing in Knowledge: Knowledge, Human Capital and Institutions for the Long Run Growth," CRANEC - Working Papers del Centro di Ricerche in Analisi economica e sviluppo economico internazionale crn0804, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Centro di Ricerche in Analisi economica e sviluppo economico internazionale (CRANEC).

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Cited by:

1. David CARFI & Caterina FICI, 2012. "The Government-Taxpayer Game," Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields, Association for Sustainable Education, Research and Science, vol. 0(1), pages 13-25, June.
   
   • Carfì, David & Fici, Caterina, 2012. "The government-taxpayer game," MPRA Paper 38506, University Library of Munich, Germany.
2. Schilirò, Daniele, 2012. "The crisis of euro’s governance: institutional aspects and policy issues," MPRA Paper 40861, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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