Voting Behaviour in a dynamic perspective: a survey
AbstractTraditional rational choice theories of voting state that, in a scenario with positive voting costs, people will vote only when they are pivotal. This hypothesis is contradicted by the frequent observation of relatively high rates of electoral turnout. Over the last few decades, several approaches have been developed in attempts to explain the paradox of not voting and to define more realistic behavioural rules, both within the rational voter framework and in opposition to that paradigm. This study offers a critical review of bounded rationality-based dynamic models. This class of model seems to be more promising than previous models in that it offers results consistent with observed voting patterns and investigates voter choices while assuming that social processes develop continuously.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37592.
Date of creation: 25 Nov 2011
Date of revision:
voting behavior; bounded rationality; dynamic models;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-04-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2012-04-03 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Schaffer, Mark E., 1989. "Are profit-maximisers the best survivors? : A Darwinian model of economic natural selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 29-45, August.
- Landi, M. & Sodini, M., 2012.
"An evolutionary analysis of turnout with conformist citizens,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 1431-1447.
- Massimiliano Landi & Mauro Sodini, 2010. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Turnout With Conformist Citizens," Working Papers 25-2010, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, 1983. "A strategic calculus of voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 7-53, January.
- Schram, Arthur & Sonnemans, Joep, 1996. "Why people vote: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 417-442, August.
- Martorana, Marco F. & Mazza, Isidoro, 2012. "Adaptive voting: an empirical analysis of participation and choice," MPRA Paper 36165, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Stefano Demichelis & Amrita Dhillon, 2010.
"Learning in Elections and Voter Turnout,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(5), pages 871-896, October.
- Selten,Reinhard, .
"Evolution,learning and economic behaviour,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
132, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Knack, Steve, 1994. " Does Rain Help the Republicans? Theory and Evidence on Turnout and the Vote," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 187-209, April.
- John Conley & Ali Toossi & Myrna Wooders, 2006. "Memetics and voting: how nature may make us public spirited," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 71-90, December.
- Blais, Andre & Young, Robert, 1999. " Why Do People Vote? An Experiment in Rationality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 39-55, April.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
- Sieg, Gernot & Schulz, Christof, 1995. " Evolutionary Dynamics in the Voting Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(1-2), pages 157-72, October.
- Alan Gerber & Donald Green & Ron Shachar, 2003. "Voting may be habit forming: Evidence from a randomized field experiment," Natural Field Experiments 00251, The Field Experiments Website.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.