Evolutionary Dynamics in the Voting Game
AbstractVoter participation is immense but theoretically doubtful because there exists cost of voting and the probability of casting the deciding ballot is low. Game theoretic models (T. R. Palfrey and H. Rosenthal, 1985) confirm this paradox of voting. Individual optimization in the voting game is problematic with respect to the rationality and information requirements of traditional game theory. Therefore, in this paper a nonoptimizing but learning individual is considered. By individual learning the adjustment processes and equilibria of voter turnout are determined. Voters are able to learn to participate and substantial voter turnout is possible. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 85 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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- Martorana, Marco F. & Mazza, Isidoro, 2012. "Adaptive voting: an empirical analysis of participation and choice," MPRA Paper 36165, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Martorana, Marco Ferdinando, 2011. "Voting Behaviour in a dynamic perspective: a survey," MPRA Paper 37592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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"A Psychologically Based Model of Voter Turnout,"
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- Ming Li & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2006. "A psychologically-based model of voter turnout," Working Papers 08008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2008.
- Li, Ming & Majumdar, Dipjyoti, 2006. "A psychologically-based model of voter turnout," MPRA Paper 10719, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2008.
- João Amaro de Matos & Pedro Barros, 2004. "Social Norms and the Paradox of Elections’ Turnout," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 239-255, October.
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