Optimal acid rain abatement policy in Europe
AbstractAcid rain causes greater environmental damage than would occur if countries act cooperatively. Based on new estimates of sulphur abatement cost functions, the potential gains from cooperation are calculated for Europe. Various cooperative abatement rates are compared with the rates implied by recent international agreements. The distinction is made between primary and secondary abatement, and their respective roles are discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 33943.
Date of creation: Jun 1994
Date of revision:
Environmental Management; abatement; acid rain; cooperation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
- Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- O52 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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