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Optimal acid rain abatement policy in Europe

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  • Halkos, G.E.

Abstract

Acid rain causes greater environmental damage than would occur if countries act cooperatively. Based on new estimates of sulphur abatement cost functions, the potential gains from cooperation are calculated for Europe. Various cooperative abatement rates are compared with the rates implied by recent international agreements. The distinction is made between primary and secondary abatement, and their respective roles are discussed.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33943/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 33943.

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Date of creation: Jun 1994
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:33943

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Related research

Keywords: Environmental Management; abatement; acid rain; cooperation;

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References

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  1. Halkos, George, 1993. "An evaluation of the direct costs of abatement under the main desulphurisation technologies," MPRA Paper 32588, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Tahvonen Olli & Kaitala Veijo & Pohjola Matti, 1993. "A Finnish - Soviet Acid Rain Game: Noncooperative Equilibria, Cost Efficiency, and Sulfur Agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 87-100, January.
  3. Welsch Heinz, 1993. "An Equilibrium Framework for Global Pollution Problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages S64-S79, July.
  4. Heal, Geoffrey, 1992. "International negotiations on emission control," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 223-240, December.
  5. George Halkos, 1994. "Optimal abatement of sulphur emissions in Europe," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(2), pages 127-150, April.
  6. Andersson, Thomas, 1991. "Government failure -- the cause of global environmental mismanagement," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 215-236, December.
  7. Newbery, David M, 1993. "The Impact of EC Environmental Policy on British Coal," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(4), pages 66-95, Winter.
  8. Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Halkos, George, 2013. "Uncertainty in optimal pollution levels: Modeling the benefit area," MPRA Paper 47768, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Halkos, George, 1994. "A game-theoretic approach to pollution control problems," MPRA Paper 33259, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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