Networks of Collaboration in Multi-market Oligopolies
AbstractThe result that firms competing in a Cournot oligopoly with pairwise collaboration form a complete network under zero or negligible link formation costs provided by Goyal and Joshi (2003) no longer hold in multi-market oligopolies. Link formation in one market aﬀects a firm’s profitability in another market in a possibly negative way resulting in the fact that it is no longer always profitable in an unambiguous manner. With non-negative link formation costs, the stable networks have a dominant group architecture and eﬃcient networks are charecterized by at most one non-singleton component with a geodesic distance between players that is less than three.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 28188.
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2010
Date of revision:
networks; collaboration; R & D;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-01-30 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2011-01-30 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2011-01-30 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-NET-2011-01-30 (Network Economics)
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