A Note on Jackson's Theorems in Bayesian Implementation
AbstractThis paper shows that in an incomplete information situation if the set of states of the society which occur with positive probability satisfies 'connection' condition, then closure condition will be satisfied by all social choice sets. It then follows from Jackson's (1991) two fundamental theorems that whenever 'connection' holds and there are at least three agents in the society, for the implementability of social choice sets in Bayesian equilibrium, incentive compatibility and Bayesian monotonicity conditions are both necessary and sufficient in economic environments whereas incentive compatibility and monotonicity-no-veto conditions are sufficient in noneconomic environments.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2330.
Date of creation: May 1997
Date of revision:
Bayesian implementation; incomplete information;
Other versions of this item:
- Ismail Saglam, 2008. "A Note on Jackson's Theorems in Bayesian Implementation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(55), pages 1-8.
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-77, March.
- Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1987. "On Bayesian Implementable Allocations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 193-208, April.
- Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 115-34, January.
- Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June.
- Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 668-91, June.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
"A crash course in implementation theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer,
Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.