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On the Non-Cooperative Foundations of Cooperative Bargaining

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  • Corchon, Luis
  • Ritzberger, Klaus

Abstract

In this note we challenge the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the grounds that the limit operation for approaching a frictionless world is not robusto We show that when discounting almost ceases to play a role, any individually rational payoff can be supported by some subgame perfect equilibrium. To select the "correct" point imposes excessive informationaL requirements on the analyst.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 18461.

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Date of creation: 1992
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:18461

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Keywords: Subgame Perfection Rubinstein Game;

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  1. Asheim, Geir B., 1992. "A unique solution to n-person sequential bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 169-181, April.
  2. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
  3. Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1992. "Another n-person bargaining game with a unique perfect equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 275-277, March.
  4. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1992. "Revocable Commitment and Sequential Bargaining," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(411), pages 378-87, March.
  5. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  6. Arial Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 623, David K. Levine.
  7. Guth, W. & Ritzberger, K., 1992. "On Durable Goods Monopolies and the (Anti-) Coase- Conjecture," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9215, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  8. Sutton, John, 1986. "Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 709-24, October.
  9. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
  10. Sjostrom, Tomas, 1991. "Stahl's bargaining model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 153-157, June.
  11. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  12. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Chae, Suchan & Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1988. "The unique perfect equilibrium of an n-person bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 221-223.
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