In this note we challenge the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the grounds that the limit operation for approaching a frictionless world is not robusto We show that when discounting almost ceases to play a role, any individually rational payoff can be supported by some subgame perfect equilibrium. To select the "correct" point imposes excessive informationaL requirements on the analyst.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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Luis Corchón & Bhaskar Chakravorti & Simon Wilkie, 1993.
"Credible Implementation,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
1993-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Chakravorti, B. & Corchon, L.C., 1992.
"Credible Implementation,"
Papers
76, Bell Communications - Economic Research Group.