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Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case

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  • Albulescu, Claudiu Tiberiu

Abstract

The process of regulation and supervision of the financial system represents a pillar for the financial stability. A recent trend in the institutional framework for financial supervision is the creation of a Single Supervision Authority for the supervision of the banking sector, the insurances and the capital markets. In the financial supervision literature, a lot of arguments highlight the fact that such institutions are necessary, but there are also other valid arguments which show that the banking supervision must be made by central banks. Taking into account these arguments we show that the institutional regulation and supervision framework reflects the structure of the Romanian financial system and the specialized supervision architecture in place in Romania is compatible with the European supervision framework. The National Bank of Romania has a solid experience in banking sector supervision and the activity of financial conglomerates is not yet a menace for the Romanian financial system stability. That is why the implementation of a unified supervision framework does not represent an optimal solution at the moment.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17225.

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Date of creation: 21 Feb 2008
Date of revision: 10 Jan 2009
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17225

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Keywords: supervision framework; single supervision authority; central banks; financial conglomerates;

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  1. Alan D. Morrison, 2003. "The Economics of Capital Regulation in Financial Conglomerates," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics, The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics, vol. 28(3), pages 521-533, 07.
  2. Masciandaro, Donato, 2007. "Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 285-315, June.
  3. Richard K. Abrams & Michael Taylor, 2000. "Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision," IMF Working Papers 00/213, International Monetary Fund.
  4. Buiter, Willem H, 2007. "Lessons from the 2007 Financial Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6596, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. David S. Bieri, 2004. "The Basel Process and Financial Stability," Macroeconomics, EconWPA 0412001, EconWPA.
  6. Paul Schmidt, 2004. "A Constitutional Treaty for an Enlarged Europe: Institutional and Economic Implications for Economic and Monetary Union," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 4, pages 77–80.
  7. Marc Quintyn & Michael Taylor, 2004. "Should Financial Sector Regulators Be Independent?," IMF Economic Issues 32, International Monetary Fund.
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