Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case
AbstractThe process of regulation and supervision of the financial system represents a pillar for the financial stability. A recent trend in the institutional framework for financial supervision is the creation of a Single Supervision Authority for the supervision of the banking sector, the insurances and the capital markets. In the financial supervision literature, a lot of arguments highlight the fact that such institutions are necessary, but there are also other valid arguments which show that the banking supervision must be made by central banks. Taking into account these arguments we show that the institutional regulation and supervision framework reflects the structure of the Romanian financial system and the specialized supervision architecture in place in Romania is compatible with the European supervision framework. The National Bank of Romania has a solid experience in banking sector supervision and the activity of financial conglomerates is not yet a menace for the Romanian financial system stability. That is why the implementation of a unified supervision framework does not represent an optimal solution at the moment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17225.
Date of creation: 21 Feb 2008
Date of revision: 10 Jan 2009
supervision framework; single supervision authority; central banks; financial conglomerates;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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