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Raisons fondamentales d'une régulation prudentielle du secteur des assurances

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  • Benjamin Lorent

Abstract

Cet article examine l’évolution des besoins en régulation du secteur des assurances. Celui-ci tend vers le secteur bancaire si bien que la frontière entre les 2 intermédiaires financiers s’estompe. La littérature assurantielle, au contraire de la littérature bancaire, est peu développée à l’exception des problèmes d’asymétrie d’information. Cet article consistera tout d’abord en une revue de la littérature sur la régulation des assurances. Ensuite, au travers des changements qui affectent le secteur, montrer l’implication sur les besoins en régulation. Au départ d’une comparaison des besoins en régulation des secteurs bancaire et des assurances, l’analyse a permis de voir une certaine convergence. La spécificité du secteur assurance tient dans son aspect social. Il permet de réduire l’incertitude des ménages et des entreprises qui peuvent se spécifier dans leur rôle, créer des initiatives personnelles et investir dans des projets. Des risques bien connus en littérature bancaire comme la panique ou le risque systémique touchent désormais le secteur assurance. Avec le développement des nouveaux produits d’assurance (essentiellement dans le secteur vie), les passifs des sociétés d’assurance deviennent plus liquides. Un risque d’inadéquation apparaît désormais plus marqué. Un risque de type panique bancaire pourrait apparaître. Les assurances investissent en masse dans les marchés financiers si bien qu’il existe désormais un lien étroit entre les deux. Les récentes fluctuations boursières ont mis en lumière la forte exposition des entreprises d’assurance aux marchés financiers. A l’inverse, les assurances ont une position plus marquée sur les marchés financiers si bien qu’une faillite généralisée du secteur pourrait induire un risque systémique.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its journal Brussels economic review.

Volume (Year): 49 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 203-244

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Handle: RePEc:bxr:bxrceb:y:2006:v:49:i:3:p:203-244

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Related research

Keywords: Assurance; Régulation; Solvabilité; Solvency II; Risque de liquidité; Risque systémique;

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