Natural Resources, Social Conflict and Poverty Trap
AbstractThe paper analyses a model where the fight for the appropriation of rents from natural resources between two groups leads to multiple equilibria. The possibility to be trapped into the low-income equilibrium, characterized by strong social conflict (civil war) and stagnation of income, increases with the weakness of political institutions, the population growth rate, the amount of rents from natural resources and the rate of depletion of natural resources and decreases with the level of per capita income, the investment rate and the length of life expectancy of individuals. The size of minority has an ambiguous effect, widening the range of income leading to low-income equilibrium, but also raising incentives to reach an agreement, i.e. a social contract, without any social conflict. Empirical evidence appears to support these findings.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy in its series Discussion Papers with number 2009/82.
Date of creation: 20 Apr 2009
Date of revision:
natural resources; social conflict; poverty trap; institutions; civil war;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O11 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O43 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
- Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2009-05-02 (Development)
- NEP-ENV-2009-05-02 (Environmental Economics)
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