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Fiscal Sustainability in a New Keynesian Model

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Author Info
Campbell Leith
Simon Wren-Lewis

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Abstract

Most recent work deriving optimal monetary policy utilising New Neo-Classical Synthesis (NNCS) models abstract from the impact of monetary policy on the government`s finances, by assuming that any change in the government`s budget can be financed through lump sum taxes. In this paper, we assume that the government does not have access to such taxes to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint in the face of shocks. We then consider optimal monetary and fiscal policies under discretion and commitment in the face of technology, preference and cost-push shocks. We confirm that the optimal precommitment policy implies a random walk in the steady-state level of debt. We also find that the time-inconsistency in the optimal precommitment policy is such that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilise their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We show that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level. This implies that under a discretionary policy the random walk result is overturned: debt will always be returned to this initial steady-state even although there is no explicit debt target in the government`s objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilise the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt-stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policy, but can be significant for discretionary policy.

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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 310.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:310

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Keywords: New Keynesian Model; Government Debt; Monetary Policy; Fiscal Policy;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Soderlind, Paul, 1999. "Solution and estimation of RE macromodels with optimal policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 813-823, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-71, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Giovanni Lombardo & Alan Sutherland, 2003. "Monetary and fiscal interactions in open economies," Working Paper Series 289, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Jensen, Henrik, 2004. "Mark-up fluctuations and fiscal policy stabilization in a monetary union," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 357-376, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Martin Ellison & Neil Rankin, 2005. " Optimal Monetary Policy When Lump-Sum Taxes Are Unavailable: A Reconsideration of the Outcomes under Commitment and Discretion," CDMA Conference Paper Series 0501, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 2001. "Optimal Monetary Policy in Open versus Closed Economies: An Integrated Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 248-252, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Campbell Leith & Simon Wren-lewis, 2006. "The Costs of Fiscal Inflexibility," WEF Working Papers 0005, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London. [Downloadable!]
  8. V.V. Chari & Lawrence J. Christiano & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1991. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy: some recent results," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 519-546.
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  9. Leith, Campbell & Wren-Lewis, Simon, 2000. "Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages C93-108, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1997. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(03), pages 588-614, September. [Downloadable!]
  11. Maurice Obstfeld and ., 1997. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C97-085, University of California at Berkeley.
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  12. Campbell leith & Jim Malley, 2002. "Estimated General Equilibrium Models for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy in the US and Europe," Working Papers 2001_16, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Leith, Campbell & Wren-Lewis, Simon, 2006. "Compatibility between monetary and fiscal policy under EMU," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1529-1556, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Raf Wouters & Frank Smets, 2005. "Comparing shocks and frictions in US and euro area business cycles: a Bayesian DSGE Approach," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 161-183. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Peter N. Ireland, 2004. "Technology Shocks in the New Keynesian Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(4), pages 923-936, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Pierpaolo Benigno & Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy: A Linear Quadratic Approach," NBER Working Papers 9905, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1991. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy: Some Recent Results," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(3), pages 540-42, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Tatiana Kirsanova & David Vines & Simon Wren-Lewis, 2007. "When Inflation Persistence Really Matters: Two examples," Kiel Working Papers 1351, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
  2. S. Gnocchi, 2007. "Discretionary Fiscal Policy and Optimal Monetary Policy in a Currency Area ," Working Papers 602, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  3. Campbell Leith & Simon Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Electoral uncertainty and the deficit bias in a New Keynesian Economy," Working Papers 2009_11, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Feb 2009. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Fabian Eser & Campbell Leith & Simon Wren-Lewis, 2009. "When is monetary policy all we need?," Working Papers 2009_18, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Svan Jari Stehn & David Vines, 2007. "Debt Stabilisation Bias And The Taylor Principle: Optimal Policy In A New Keynesian Model With Government Debt And Inflation Persistence," CAMA Working Papers 2007-22, Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Sven Jari Stehn & David Vines, 2008. "Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt," IMF Working Papers 08/164, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Campbell Leith & Simon Wren-Lewis, 2006. "The Costs of Fiscal Inflexibility - Extended," Working Papers 2005_23, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
  8. Campbell Leith & Simon Wren-Lewis, 2005. " Fiscal Policy as a Stabilisation Device for an Open Economy Inside or Outside EMU," CDMA Conference Paper Series 0506, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  9. Raffaele Rossi, 2007. "Rule of Thumb Consumers, Public Debt and Income Tax," Working Papers 2007_44, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Dec 2007. [Downloadable!]
  10. Jim Malley & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Ulrich Woitek, 2007. "To React or Not? Fiscal Policy, Volatility and Welfare in the EU-3," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Campbell Leith & Simon Wren-lewis, 2006. "The Costs of Fiscal Inflexibility," WEF Working Papers 0005, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London. [Downloadable!]
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