The Choice of Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and The Costs of Laws Limiting that Choice
AbstractThis paper uses a new data source to analyze the choice of organizational form of retail gasoline stations. In recent years, gasoline stations have tended to be less likely to be owned and operated by a lessee dealer and more likely to be owned and operated by the refiner. Critics have alleged that company-operated stations are used to drive lessee dealer stations out of business in order to restrict competition. We examine the determinants of organizational form and find them to be based on efficiency not predatory concerns. We estimate the costs of recent laws prohibiting company ownership of gasoline stations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 7435.
Date of creation: Dec 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Blass, Asher A. and Dennis W. Carlton. "The Choice Of Organizational Form In Gasoline Retailing And The Cost Of Laws That Limit Choice," Journal of Law and Economics, 2001, v44(2,Oct), 511-524.
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Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-12-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-1999-12-21 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-IND-1999-12-21 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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