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Policy Signaling in the Open Economy: A Re-Examination

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Author Info
Allan Drazen

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Abstract

The standard model of signaling used in open economy macroeconomics concentrates on building a reputation when a policymaker's `type' is unknown. Observing tough policy leads market participants to raise the probability that a policymaker is tough, and therefore to expect tough policy in the future. This approach leaves unexplained a number of commonly observed occurrences, for example, toughness in defending an exchange rate leading to increased speculation against the currency. To explain many phenomena, this paper argues, more sophisticated signaling models are needed, models which include signaling of resources rather than preferences, policy affecting the environment in which signals are sent, and exogenous changes in the environment affecting the informativeness of signals. These models are explored and are shown to be able to explain a number of phenomena the standard reputational model cannot.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5892.

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Date of creation: Jan 1997
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5892

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General

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  1. Persson, Torsten, 1988. "An introduction and a broad survey," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 519-532, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dooley, Michael P & Isard, Peter, 1980. "Capital Controls, Political Risk, and Deviations from Interest-Rate Parity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 370-84, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kenneth Rogoff, 1987. "Reputational Constraints on Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1986, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Paul R. Masson & Allan Drazen, 1994. "Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers," IMF Working Papers 94/49, International Monetary Fund.
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  6. Giavazzi, Francesco & Spaventa, Luigi, 1990. "The `New' EMS," CEPR Discussion Papers 369, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Francesco Giavazzi & Luigi Spaventa, 1990. "The "New" EMS," Working Papers 86, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  7. Leonardo Bartolini & Allan Drazen, 1997. "Capital Account Liberalization as a Signal," NBER Working Papers 5725, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Blanchard, Olivier J., 1985. "Credibility, disinflation and gradualism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 211-217. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Liviatan, Nissan, 1984. "Tight money and inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 5-15, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Drazen, Allan, 1985. "Tight money and inflation: Further Results," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 113-120, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1987. "Reputational constraints on monetary policy," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 141-181, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. David M. Gould, 1999. "Does the choice of nominal anchor matter?," Center for Latin America Working Papers 0499, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. [Downloadable!]
  2. Reuven Glick & Michael Hutchison, . "Stopping "Hot Money" or Signaling Bad Policy? Capital Controls and the Onset of Currency Crises," EPRU Working Paper Series 00-14, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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