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Implementing Market Access

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  • Kala Krishna
  • Suddhasatwa Roy
  • Marie Thursby

Abstract

The outcome of trade policies to increase access for foreign firms to the home country's market is shown to be sensitive to the implementation procedure used. The importance of the timing of moves between government and firms is highlighted by focusing on taxes and subsidies to implement minimum market share requirements. Both taxes and subsidies chosen by the home government after firms have picked prices create powerful incentives for firms to raise prices - effects that are similar in nature to those found with quotas/VERs. We show that some degree of imprecision in implementing the target engenders less anticompetitive outcomes relative to perfect enforcement.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5593.

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Date of creation: May 1996
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Publication status: published as Review of International Economics, Vol.6, no.4 (1998): 529-544.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5593

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References

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  1. Pinelopi K. Goldberg & Michael M. Knetter, 1995. "Causes and Consequences of the Export Enhancement Program for Wheat," NBER Working Papers 5359, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
  3. Douglas A. Irwin, 1996. "Trade Policies and the Semiconductor Industry," NBER Chapters, in: The Political Economy of American Trade Policy, pages 11-72 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. repec:fth:osakae:304 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Gruenspecht, Howard K., 1988. "Export subsidies for differentiated products," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3-4), pages 331-344, May.
  6. Brainard, S.L. & Martimort, D., 1992. "Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed Policymakers," Papers 92.277, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  7. Ethier, W.J. & Horn, H., 1993. "Results-Oriented Trade Policy," ISER Discussion Paper 0304, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  8. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
  9. Dinopoulos, Elias & Kreinin, Mordechai E, 1990. "An Analysis of Import Expansion Policies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(1), pages 99-108, January.
  10. Kala Krishna & Suddhasatwa Roy & Marie Thursby, 1997. "Procompetitive Market Access," NBER Working Papers 6184, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Douglas A. Irwin, 1994. "Trade Politics and the Semi-conductor Industry," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 92, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  12. Kala Krishna, 1989. "The Case of the Vanishing Revenues: Auction Quotas with Monopoly," NBER Working Papers 2840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Neil Bjorksten, 1994. "Voluntary Import Expansions and Voluntary Export Restraints in an Oligopoly Model with Capacity Constraints," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(2), pages 446-57, May.
  14. Krishna, Kala, 1989. "Trade restrictions as facilitating practices," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 251-270, May.
  15. Carmichael, Calum M., 1987. "The control of export credit subsidies and its welfare consequences," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 1-19, August.
  16. Eaton, Jonathan & Grossman, Gene M, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406, May.
  17. Greaney, Theresa M., 1996. "Import now! An analysis of market-share voluntary import expansions (VIEs)," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 149-163, February.
  18. Kowalczyk, Carsten, 1994. "Monopoly and trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-2), pages 177-186, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Krishna, Kala & Morgan, John, 1998. "Implementing results-oriented trade policies: The case of the US-Japanese auto parts dispute," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(8), pages 1443-1467, September.
  2. Byron Gangnes & Craig Parsons, 2004. "Have US-Japan Trade Agreements Made a Difference?," Working Papers 200403, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  3. Kala Krishna & Suddhasatwa Roy & Marie Thursby, 1997. "Procompetitive Market Access," NBER Working Papers 6184, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Thierry Verdier, 1998. "Results-oriented versus rules-oriented trade policies:: A theoretical survey," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 733-744, May.
  5. Greaney, Theresa M., 2000. "Righting past wrongs: can import promotion policies counter hysteresis from past trade protection in the presence of switching costs?," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 211-227, September.
  6. Kala Krishna & Suddhasatwa Roy & Marie C. Thursby, 2000. "Can Subsidies for MARs be Procompetitive?," NBER Working Papers 7624, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Qiu, Larry D. & Spencer, Barbara J., 2002. "Keiretsu and relationship-specific investment: implications for market-opening trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 49-79, October.
  8. Spencer, Barbara J & Qiu, Larry D, 2001. "Keiretsu and Relationship-Specific Investment: A Barrier to Trade?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(4), pages 871-901, November.
  9. Ju, Jiandong & Krishna, Kala, 2000. "Welfare and market access effects of piecemeal tariff reform," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 305-316, August.

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