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The Value of Social Status

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander W. Butler
  • Bruce I. Carlin
  • Alan D. Crane
  • Boyang Liu
  • James P. Weston

Abstract

We quantify the value of social status using market prices for Delaware license plates. Delaware plates are numbered sequentially, are private property, and can be legally bequeathed or traded in a secondary market. License plates offer no direct economic benefit other than authorizing the operation of a motor vehicle. But they appear to be a source of social status. Not only do market prices suggest a preference for lower plate numbers, but there exist extreme price jumps that indicate that exclusive clubs exist whereby the number of digits on the plate convey implicit membership. The aggregate value of this market indicates that people purchase status as a significant portion of their consumption bundle. Finally, social status as an asset appears to be uncorrelated with aggregate economic and market conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander W. Butler & Bruce I. Carlin & Alan D. Crane & Boyang Liu & James P. Weston, 2020. "The Value of Social Status," NBER Working Papers 27979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27979
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Persaud, 2023. "A (paid) passage to India: Migration and revealed willingness to pay for upper‐caste status," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(3), pages 652-674, July.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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