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Bank Size, Reputation, and Debt Renegotiation


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  • Raquel Fernandez
  • David Kaaret


This paper examines the effect that the coexistence of small and large banks, with different interests in the international market, has on the debt renegotiation process. Making use of a reputational model, we argue that the presence of small banks implies that debtor countries have a harder tine obtaining new money than what they would have absent the small banks.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 2704.

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Date of creation: Sep 1988
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as International Economic Review, February, 1992.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2704

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Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
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  1. Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, 1995. "Sovereign Debt," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development 59, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
  2. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-78, February.
  3. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
  4. Jeffrey Sachs, 1983. "Theoretical Issues in International Borrowing," NBER Working Papers 1189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:
  1. Amartya Lahiri & Hinh T. Dinh, 1996. "External debt and creditworthiness : theory with evidence," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 110-125, Autumn.
  2. Mamoru Kaneko & Jacek Prokop, 1991. "A Game Theoretical Approach to the International Debt Overhang," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 945, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Jeffrey Sachs, 1986. "The Bolivian Hyperinflation and Stabilization," NBER Working Papers 2073, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Raquel Fernandez & Jacob Glazer, 1989. "The Scope for Collusive Behavior Among Debtor Countries," NBER Working Papers 2980, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Diwan, Ishac & Claessens, Stijn, 1989. "An analysis of debt-reduction schemes initiated by debtor countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 153, The World Bank.


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