Institutional Adaptability and Economic Development: The Property Rights Revolution in Britain, 1700 to 1830
AbstractAdaptable property-rights institutions, we argue, foster economic development. The British example illustrates this point. Around 1700, Parliament established a forum where rights to land and resources could be reorganized. This venue enabled landholders and communities to take advantage of economic opportunities that could not be accommodated by the inflexible rights regime inherited from the past. In this essay, historical evidence, archival data, and statistical analysis demonstrate that Parliament increased the number of acts reorganizing property rights in response to increases in the public's demand for such acts. This evidence corroborates a cornerstone of our hypothesis.
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Date of creation: Jan 2008
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- K0 - Law and Economics - - General
- K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
- N0 - Economic History - - General
- N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
- P1 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems
- P10 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - General
- P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
- P20 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - General
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
- P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-02-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2008-02-02 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-LAW-2008-02-02 (Law & Economics)
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