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Electoral fraud, the rise of Peron and demise of checks and balances in Argentina

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  • Alston, Lee J.
  • Gallo, Andrés A.

Abstract

The future looked bright for Argentina in the early twentieth century. It had already achieved high levels of income per capita and was moving away from authoritarian government towards a more open democracy. Unfortunately, Argentina never finished the transition. The turning point occurred in the 1930s when to stay in power, the Conservatives in the Pampas resorted to electoral fraud, which neither the legislative, executive, or judicial branches checked. The decade of unchecked electoral fraud led to the support for Juan Peron and subsequently to political and economic instability.

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  • Alston, Lee J. & Gallo, Andrés A., 2010. "Electoral fraud, the rise of Peron and demise of checks and balances in Argentina," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 179-197, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:47:y:2010:i:2:p:179-197
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    2. Muro, Sergio & Chehtman, Alejandro, 2020. "Law or strategic calculus? Abstention in the Argentine Supreme Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    3. Maximiliano Marzetti & Rok Spruk, 2023. "Long-Term Economic Effects of Populist Legal Reforms: Evidence from Argentina," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 65(1), pages 60-95, March.
    4. Rafael Tella & Juan Dubra, 2018. "Some elements of Peronist beliefs and tastes," Latin American Economic Review, Springer;Centro de Investigaciòn y Docencia Económica (CIDE), vol. 27(1), pages 1-34, December.
    5. Eric C. Edwards & Martin Fiszbein & Gary D. Libecap, 2022. "Property Rights to Land and Agricultural Organization: An Argentina–United States Comparison," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(S1), pages 1-33.
    6. Nauro F. Campos & Menelaos G. Karanasos & Michail Karoglou & Panagiotis Koutroumpis & Constantin Zopounidis & Apostolos Christopoulos, 2022. "Apocalypse now, apocalypse when? Economic growth and structural breaks in Argentina (1886–2003)," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(1), pages 3-32, January.
    7. Cachanosky, Nicolás & Padilla, Alexandre & Gómez, Alejandro, 2021. "Immigration and institutional change: Did mass immigration cause peronism in argentina?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 1-15.
    8. Emilio Ocampo, 2023. "Dollarization as an Effective Commitment Device: The Case of Argentina," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 848, Universidad del CEMA.
    9. Steven Webb, 2017. "Populism: A Threat to Democracy? Or a verification of it?," Journal of Contextual Economics (JCE) – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 137(4), pages 401-420.
    10. Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael Tella & Lucas Llach, 2018. "Introduction to Argentine exceptionalism," Latin American Economic Review, Springer;Centro de Investigaciòn y Docencia Económica (CIDE), vol. 27(1), pages 1-22, December.
    11. Lee J. Alston & Marcus André Melo & Bernardo Mueller & Carlos Pereira, 2016. "A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Critical Transitions," NBER Working Papers 22144, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    14. Emilio Ocampo, 2015. "Commodity Price Booms and Populist Cycles. An Explanation of Argentina’s Decline in the 20th Century," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 562, Universidad del CEMA.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Critical junctures Property rights Credible commitment Beliefs Rule of law Supreme Court;

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • N16 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • N26 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O54 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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