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Real Options in a Dynamic Agency Model, with Applications to Financial Development, IPOs, and Business Risk

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  • Thomas Philippon
  • Yuliy Sannikov

Abstract

We study investment options in a dynamic agency model. Moral hazard creates an option to wait and agency conflicts affect the timing of investment. The model sheds light, theoretically and quantitatively, on the evolution of firms' dynamics, in particular the decline of the failure rate and the decrease in the age of IPOs.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13584.

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Date of creation: Nov 2007
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13584

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  1. Tim Loughran & Jay Ritter, 2004. "Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 33(3), Fall.
  2. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2000. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," NBER Working Papers 7660, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Steven J. Davis & John Haltiwanger & Ron Jarmin & Javier Miranda, 2007. "Volatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates: Publicly Traded versus Privately Held Firms," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2006, Volume 21, pages 107-180 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Ricardo J. Caballero & Eduardo M.R.A. Engel, 1994. "Explaining Investment Dynamics in U.S. Manufacturing: A Generalized (S,s) Approach," NBER Working Papers 4887, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Rui Albuquerque & Hugo A. Hopenhayn, 2004. "Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(2), pages 285-315, 04.
  6. Boyan Jovanovic & Peter L. Rousseau, 2001. "Why Wait? A Century of Life before IPO," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 336-341, May.
  7. Jenkinson, Tim & Ljungqvist, Alexander, 2001. "Going Public: The Theory and Evidence on How Companies Raise Equity Finance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 2, number 9780198295990, Octomber.
  8. Gian Luca Clementi & Hugo Hopenhayn, . "A Theory of Financing Constraints and Firm Dynamics," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E9, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  9. Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, 2007. "Skill Biased Financial Development: Education, Wages and Occupations in the U.S. Financial Sector," NBER Working Papers 13437, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2004. "Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 713-751, May.
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  16. Schmidt, Klaus M., 2003. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," Munich Reprints in Economics 19769, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  17. Jain, Bharat A & Kini, Omesh, 1994. " The Post-Issue Operating Performance of IPO Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(5), pages 1699-1726, December.
  18. Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2003. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," NBER Working Papers 10132, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Woojin Kim & Michael S. Weisbach, 2005. "Motivations for Public Equity Offers: An International Perspective," NBER Working Papers 11797, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Robert E. Hall & Susan E. Woodward, 2007. "The Incentives to Start New Companies: Evidence from Venture Capital," NBER Working Papers 13056, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Diego A. Comin & Thomas Philippon, 2006. "The Rise in Firm-Level Volatility: Causes and Consequences," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2005, Volume 20, pages 167-228 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. John Y. Campbell, 2001. "Have Individual Stocks Become More Volatile? An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 1-43, 02.
  23. Tomasz Piskorski & Alexei Tchistyi, 2010. "Optimal Mortgage Design," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(8), pages 3098-3140, August.
  24. PETER M. DeMARZO & YULIY SANNIKOV, 2006. "Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous-Time Agency Model," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2681-2724, December.
  25. Spear, Stephen E & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2013. "Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(10), pages 2620-2647.
  2. Çolak, Gönül & Günay, Hikmet, 2011. "Strategic waiting in the IPO markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 555-583, June.

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