This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Averting Regulatory Enforcement: Evidence from New Source Review

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Nathaniel Keohane
Erin T. Mansur
Andrey Voynov

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper explores firms' response to regulatory enforcement. New Source Review, a provision of the Clean Air Act, imposes stringent emissions limitations on significantly modified older power plants. In 1999, the EPA sued owners of 46 plants for NSR violations. We study how electricity companies respond to both the perceived threat of future action, and the action itself. A discrete choice model estimates plants likelihood of being named in lawsuits increases with large historic emissions and investments. On the eve of the lawsuits, emissions at plants with a one standard deviation greater probability of being sued fell approximately ten percent.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13512.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13512.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13512

Note: EEE IO
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gray, Wayne B. & Deily, Mary E., 1996. "Compliance and Enforcement: Air Pollution Regulation in the U.S. Steel Industry," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 96-111, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Laplante, Benoit & Rilstone, Paul, 1996. "Environmental Inspections and Emissions of the Pulp and Paper Industry in Quebec," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 19-36, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. John List & Daniel Millimet & Warren McHone, 2004. "The Unintended Disincentive in the Clean Air Act," Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(2), pages 1204-1204. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Glachant, Matthieu, 2007. "Non-binding voluntary agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 32-48, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Maloney, Michael T & Brady, Gordon L, 1988. "Capital Turnover and Marketable Pollution Rights," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 203-26, April.
  6. Nelson, Randy A, 1984. "Regulation, Capital Vintage, and Technical Change in the Electric Utility Industry," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 66(1), pages 59-69, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bartel, Ann P & Thomas, Lacy Glenn, 1985. "Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA's Impact," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-25, April.
  8. Juan-Pablo Montero, 1999. "Voluntary Compliance with Market-Based Environmental Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Acid Rain Program," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 998-1033, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Magat, Wesley A & Viscusi, W Kip, 1990. "Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 331-60, October.
  10. Lutz, Stefan & Lyon, Thomas P & Maxwell, John W, 2000. "Quality Leadership When Regulatory Standards Are Forthcoming," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(3), pages 331-48, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Maxwell, John W & Lyon, Thomas P & Hackett, Steven C, 2000. "Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 583-617, October.
    Other versions:
  12. Eckert, Heather, 2004. "Inspections, warnings, and compliance: the case of petroleum storage regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 232-259, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Anton, W.R.Q.Wilma Rose Q. & Deltas, George & Khanna, Madhu, 2004. "Incentives for environmental self-regulation and implications for environmental performance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 632-654, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Lyon, Thomas P. & Maxwell, John W., 2003. "Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1453-1486, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Murphy, Kevin M & Topel, Robert H, 1985. "Estimation and Inference in Two-Step Econometric Models," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 3(4), pages 370-79, October.
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can import bibliographic info in various formats into you bibliographic tool, or just into your word processor. See under "publisher info" on each abstract page.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-28.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.