Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Negotiating a voluntary agreement when firms self-regulate

Contents:

Author Info

  • Fleckinger, Pierre
  • Glachant, Matthieu

Abstract

Does self-regulation improve social welfare? We develop a policy game featuring a regulator and a firm that can unilaterally commit to better environmental or social behavior in order to preempt future public policy efforts. We show that the answer depends on the set of policy instruments available to the regulator. Self-regulation improves welfare if the regulator can only use mandatory regulation, but it reduces welfare when the regulator opts for a voluntary agreement. This suggests that self-regulation and voluntary agreements are not good complements from a welfare point of view. We derive policy implications, and extend the basic model in several dimensions.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069611000295
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 62 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 41-52

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:62:y:2011:i:1:p:41-52

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

Related research

Keywords: Self-regulation Negotiation Regulation preemption Voluntary agreement;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Glachant, Matthieu, 2007. "Non-binding voluntary agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 32-48, July.
  2. Arora, Seema & Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis, 1995. "Toward a theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 289-309, December.
  3. Brekke, Kjell Arne & Nyborg, Karine, 2008. "Attracting responsible employees: Green production as labor market screening," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 509-526, December.
  4. John Maxwell & Christopher Decker, 2006. "Voluntary Environmental Investment and Responsive Regulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 33(4), pages 425-439, 04.
  5. Denicolò, Vincenzo, 2008. "A signaling model of environmental overcompliance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 293-303, October.
  6. Lyon, Thomas P. & Maxwell, John W., 2003. "Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1453-1486, August.
  7. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, 2007. "Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical Perspective," Working Papers, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy 2007-16, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  8. John W. Maxwell & Thomas P Lyon & Steven C.. Hackett, 1995. "Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State 122, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  9. Baron, David P., 2008. "Managerial contracting and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 268-288, February.
  10. Heyes, Anthony G., 2005. "A signaling motive for self-regulation in the shadow of coercion," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 238-246.
  11. Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2007. "Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1645-1663, September.
  12. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2003. "A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2725-2736, December.
  13. Segerson, Kathleen & Miceli, Thomas J., 1998. "Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 109-130, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:62:y:2011:i:1:p:41-52. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.