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The economic analysis of voluntary approaches to environmental protection. A survey

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  • R. Brau

    ()

  • C. Carraro

Abstract

This paper surveys the recent literature on voluntary (or negotiated) approaches as an environmental policy tool. Rather than adopting a positive perspective and describing different types of voluntary approaches (VAs) and their main features or their pros and cons, this survey focuses on the economic incentives for firms or industries to adopt VAs. The consequent role that VAs may play within a set of policy tools designed to address environmental problems is then assessed. A careful understanding of the economic incentives that induce a firm to sign a VA is indeed crucial to identify and design the policy mix that makes the VA both environmentally effective and economically efficient.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia in its series Working Paper CRENoS with number 200420.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cns:cnscwp:200420

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References

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  1. Khanna, Madhu & Damon, Lisa A., 1999. "EPA's Voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on Toxic Releases and Economic Performance of Firms," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-25, January.
  2. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GABSZEWICZ, Jean J., . "On the stability of collusion," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -702, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Kuhn, Michael, 1999. "Green Lemons - Environmental Labels and Entry into an Environmentally Differentiated Market under Asymmetric Information," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics 20, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
  4. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-71, May.
  5. Alberto Cavaliere, 2000. "Overcompliance and Voluntary Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 17(2), pages 195-202, October.
  6. Segerson, Kathleen & Miceli, Thomas J., 1998. "Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 109-130, September.
  7. John W. Maxwell & Thomas P Lyon & Steven C.. Hackett, 1995. "Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State 122, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
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  9. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Environmental Innovation Policy and International Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 525, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Jean-Jacques LAFFONT & Jean TIROLE, 1990. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making : a Theory of Regulatory Capture," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP), Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP 9004, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  11. Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, 2002. "Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 157-184, June.
  12. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata, 2002. "Environmental Labeling and Incomplete Consumer Information in Laboratory Markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 113-134, January.
  13. Lyon, Thomas P. & Maxwell, John W., 2003. "Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1453-1486, August.
  14. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
  15. Lutz, Stefan & Lyon, Thomas P & Maxwell, John W, 2000. "Quality Leadership When Regulatory Standards Are Forthcoming," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 331-48, September.
  16. Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1999. "The Relative Efficiency of Voluntary vs Mandatory Environmental Regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 158-175, September.
  17. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
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  19. Na Li Dawson & Kathleen Segerson, 2003. "Voluntary Agreements with Industries: Participation Incentives with Industry-wide Targets," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 2004-06, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  20. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2003. "A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2725-2736, December.
  21. Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, 2001. "Does The Market Value Environmental Performance?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(2), pages 281-289, May.
  22. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscaico, Domenico, 1994. "Environmental policy reconsidered: The role of technological innovation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 545-554, April.
  23. Mark Bagnoli & Susan G. Watts, 2003. "Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 419-445, 09.
  24. Konar, Shameek & Cohen, Mark A., 1997. "Information As Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 109-124, January.
  25. Tran Huu Dung, 1993. "Optimal Taxation and Heterogeneous Oligopoly," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(4), pages 933-47, November.
  26. Arora Seema & Cason Timothy N., 1995. "An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental Regulation: Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 271-286, May.
  27. Khanna, Madhu, 2001. " Non-mandatory Approaches to Environmental Protection," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 291-324, July.
  28. Rinaldo Brau & Carlo Carraro, 2011. "The design of voluntary agreements in oligopolistic markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 111-142, April.
  29. Hansen, Lars Gårn, 1997. "Environmental Regulation through Voluntary Agreements," MPRA Paper 47537, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 1999.
  30. Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason, 1996. "Why Do Firms Volunteer to Exceed Environmental Regulations? Understanding Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 72(4), pages 413-432.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Rosetta Lombardo, 2009. "Beyond Compliance: Firms’ Environmental Behaviour. A Survey," Working Papers, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza (Ex Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica) 200918, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza (Ex Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica).
  2. Rinaldo Brau & Carlo Carraro, 2011. "The design of voluntary agreements in oligopolistic markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 111-142, April.
  3. O. Carboni & G. Medda, 2007. "Government Size and the Composition of Public Spending in a Neoclassical Growth Model," Working Paper CRENoS 200701, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
  4. Lozano, Javier & Blanco, Ester & Rey-Maquieira, Javier, 2010. "Can ecolabels survive in the long run?: The role of initial conditions," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(12), pages 2525-2534, October.
  5. Parashar Kulkarni, 2010. "Pushing lenders to over-comply with environmental regulations: A developing country perspective," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(4), pages 470-482.
  6. Blanco, Ester & Lozano, Javier & Rey-Maquieira, Javier, 2009. "A dynamic approach to voluntary environmental contributions in tourism," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 104-114, November.

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