Effects of inspections on plants' regulatory and environmental performance - evidence from Norwegian manufacturing industries
AbstractThe present paper investigates effects of regulatory inspections on compliance and emissions of energy intensive manufacturing plants in Norway. The regression analysis shows that increased probability of inspection reduces the probability of violation. This is in line with previous studies, and may appear as an encouraging evaluation of the practiced regulatory enforcement policy. However, the direct environmental impact of the enforcement policy is more dubious: Regression analyses reveal a positive relationship between the probability of an inspection and emissions. It appears puzzeling that increased probability of inspection can yield both reduced probability of violation and higher emissions. The possibility that such a puzzle evolves from incentives inherent in the practiced regulatory policy is discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Department of Statistics Norway in its series Discussion Papers with number 381.
Date of creation: Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Environmental regulations; regulatory enforcement; inspections; emissions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-11-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2004-11-22 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2004-11-22 (Regulation)
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