Tax competition and the move from insurance to assistance

The funding of social protection has strongly evolved in Bismarckian countries: whereas social protection used to rely on social contributions, since the 1990s most of the new expenditures have been funded through taxation, leading to a more balanced mix in the structure of social protection revenue. I propose a formal model in which two social protection systems may coexist: insurance and assistance. Insurance level is set by consensus between firms and unions, whereas assistance expenditures are set by a majority vote in parliament. Social insurance can be manipulated to influence preferences in respect of assistance. It is shown how an exogenous increase in tax competition in a Bismarckian context can lead to the emergence of a mixed model: assistance increases to complement existing insurance, not to replace it. A time series cross-section analysis on 9 countries over 25 years supports the idea that a drop in corporate tax rates can trigger a shift in the tax structure of social protection funding