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Diversité des fiscalités européennes et risques de concurrence fiscale


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  • Jacques Le Cacheux
  • Thierry Madiès
  • Réjane Hugounenq


[eng] The adoption of the common currency within a context of European fiscal systems diversity could lead to fierce tax competition. Capital income taxation is at stake. The fiscal gap on the corporate income tax between the European country is measured with the cost of capital concept. We find that it can be superior to 30%. In ail countries income from savings are nearly tax free for non resident thus providing a strong incentive to invest abroad. The European Commission propositions aim at minimising the potential effects of fiscal competition on fiscal deficits rather than focusing on economie efficiency. The Commission proposes a « code de bonne conduite » for the corporate income tax and a minimum « withdrawal » savings income tax. Those propositions will not be efficient unless the unanimity voting rule is reconsidered. If not, fiscal competition will prevail. JEL Codes : F42, H20, H87 [fre] Les systèmes fiscaux européens sont très diversifiés et bon nombre d'observateurs craignent que la mise en place de l'euro ne favorise une concurrence fiscale accrue entre États-membres. Celle-ci pourrait se traduire à terme par une dégradation des finances publiques, une exonération de fait des bases les plus mobiles avec un report de la charge fiscale sur les bases les moins mobiles, et une perte de souveraineté des États, notamment par rapport à leur capacité à mettre en œuvre des politiques de redistribution. Actuellement, le débat porte essentiellement sur la fiscalité pesant sur les revenus du capital — impôt sur le bénéfice des sociétés et sur les revenus de placement. En effet, ces revenus sont potentiellement mobiles et les écarts de fiscalité, mesurés grâce au calcul de coûts du capital dans le cas de l'impôt sur les sociétés, sont importants — ils peuvent être supérieurs à 30 % dans certains cas. En ce qui concerne les revenus de l'épargne, force est de constater que le jeu auquel se livrent les États tourne à l'absurde : chaque État taxe ses résidents mais n'impose pas les non-résidents dans un contexte où chacun peut aller chez le voisin. Dans ces conditions, la Commission européenne adopte désormais une position plus pragmatique qu'il y a une dizaine d'années où l'objectif était d'harmoniser les fiscalités nationales pour réduire les distorsions de concurrence entre États. L'accent est mis davantage sur le caractère dommageable d'une concurrence fiscale non maîtrisée, comme en témoignent la proposition de directive concernant l'instauration d'une retenue à la source pour les revenus de l'épargne ou l'adoption par les États en 1997 d'un code de bonne conduite. Quoi qu'il en soit, en vertu de la règle de l'unanimité en matière d'harmonisation fiscale, un pays comme le Luxembourg, favorable à la concurrence fiscale compte tenu des règles qui régissent le secret bancaire dans cet État, se trouve en position de leader dans les négociations.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue de l'OFCE.

Volume (Year): 70 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 63-109

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Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1999_num_70_1_1692

Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1999.1692
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  1. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-92, September.
  2. Marie-Hélène Blonde & Gérard Cornilleau & Pascal Helwaser & Jacques Le & Jean Le & Henri Sterdyniak, 1990. "Vers une fiscalité européenne ?," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(2), pages 121-189.
  3. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1997. "The selection principle and market failure in systems competition," Munich Reprints in Economics 19854, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  4. Joel B. Slemrod, 1990. "Tax Effects on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison," NBER Chapters, in: Taxation in the Global Economy, pages 79-122 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Rosanne Altshuler & Jack Mintz, 1994. "U.S. Interest Allocation Rules: Effects and Policy," NBER Working Papers 4712, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Young, Kan H., 1988. "The Effects of Taxes and Rates of Return on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 41(1), pages 109-21, March.
  7. Frenkel, Jacob & Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 1992. "International taxation in an integrated world," MPRA Paper 23266, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Janeba, Eckhard, 1997. "International Tax Competition," Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, edition 1, volume 1, number urn:isbn:9783161467967, July.
  9. Moncef Hadhri & Marcel Gérard, 1996. "Inter-jurisdictional information sharing and capital tax game under imperfect capital mobility," Brussels Economic Review, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 152, pages 487-516.
  10. Devereux, Michael P. & Pearson, Mark, 1995. "European tax harmonisation and production efficiency," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 1657-1681, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Lammersen, Lothar, 2002. "The Measurement of Effective Tax Rates: Common Themes in Business Management and Economics," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-46, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  2. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré & Lionel Fontagné & Amina Lahrèche-Revil, 2000. "Foreign Direct Investment and the Prospects for Tax Co-Ordination in Europe," Working Papers 2000-06, CEPII research center.
  3. Michaël Zemmour, 2012. "Tax competition and the move from insurance to assistance," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12090r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Mar 2013.
  4. Christophe Blot, 2002. "Les politiques budgétaires au sein de l’UEM : entre convergence et asymétrie," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 69(5), pages 247-268.
  5. Krogstrup, Signe, 2002. "Public debt asymmetries: the effect on taxes and spending in the European Union," Working Paper Series 0162, European Central Bank.


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