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Can We Tax The Desire For Tax Evasion?

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Author Info
Ratbek Dzhumashev
Emin Gahramanov

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Abstract

A static income tax evasion model ?? la Yitzhaki (1974) predicts that an increase in the tax rate causes taxpayers to increase their income declaration. In an important contribution, Lin and Yang (2001) obtained exactly the opposite result by extending the Yitzhaki (1974) model to a dynamic one with Ak(t) production technology. In this paper we show that once the Lin and Yang (2001) model becomes fully compatible with the Yitzhaki's (1974) setting, the negative relationship between taxes and evasion still prevails. We then enrich the dynamic model with a productive public sector, and obtain an ambiguous relationship between taxes and evasion incentives as in Allingham and Sandmo (1972). We also prove that the growth-maximizing share of public expenditures in total output satisfies the natural efficiency condition even in the presence of tax evasion. However, the latter result is not robust to the introduction of the costs associated with income declaration and concealment activities.

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Paper provided by Monash University, Department of Economics in its series Monash Economics Working Papers with number 28/08.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2008
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Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:2008-28

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Related research
Keywords: Tax Evasion; Optimal Taxation; Economic Growth;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving

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  2. Turnovsky, Stephen J. & Fisher, Walter H., 1995. "The composition of government expenditure and its consequences for macroeconomic performance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 747-786, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  4. Kolm, Serge-Christophe, 1973. "A note on optimum tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 265-270, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gordon, James P. P., 1989. "Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 797-805, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Jordi Caball?Author-Email: Jordi.Caballe@uab.es & Judith Panad?, 2001. "On the Relation between Tax Rates and Evasion in a Multi-period Economy," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 500.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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  14. Joel Slemrod, 2007. "Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 25-48, Winter.
  15. Cowell,Frank & Gordon,James, 1987. "Unwillingness to pay: Tax evasion and public good provision," Discussion Paper Serie A 142, University of Bonn, Germany.
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  16. Niepelt, Dirk, 2005. "Timing tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1611-1637, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Fisher, Walter H & Turnovsky, Stephen J, 1998. "Public Investment, Congestion, and Private Capital Accumulation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 399-413, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1994. " Tax Evasion, Concealment and the Optimal Linear Income Tax," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 96(2), pages 219-39.
  19. Been-Lon Chen & Shun-Fa Lee, 2009. "Two-Sector Growth Models with Productive Public Goods: Equilibrium (In)determinacy," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 639–662, January.
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  22. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Geeroms, Hans J A & Wilmots, Hendrik, 1985. "An Empirical Model of Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 40(2), pages 190-209.
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  25. Ralph C Bayer & Matthias Sutter, 2004. "The excess burden of tax evasion - An experimental detection- concealment contest," Experimental 0412003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  26. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. repec:att:wimass:199610 is not listed on IDEAS
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