We develop a framework, extending the conventional duopoly model by replacing the Hotelling line with a simplex in high???dimension spaces, to study the competition and access regulation of multiple networks. We first characterize the competitive equilibrium when the substitutabilities of the networks are not too high, or the access charges are nearly cost???based. We then analyse how the equilibrium market shares respond to marginal variations in the access charges under various regimes of access regulation, and thereby examine the efficiency implications of such regulation regimes. In particular, we analyze the asymmetric scenario in which some networks are incumbent and some are entrants. It is shown that some existing results of the duopoly do not extend to a multi???firm setting, largely because regulation of multiple networks is structurally far richer.
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Paper provided by Monash University, Department of Economics in its series Monash Economics Working Papers with number
25/08.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Xavier Gine & Pamela Jakiela & Dean Karlan & Jonathan Morduch, 2006.
"Microfinance Games,"
Working Papers
2102, The Field Experiments Website.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Dean Karlan & Xavier Gine & Jonathan Morduch & Pamela Jakiela, 2006.
"Microfinance Games,"
Working Papers
936, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
[Downloadable!]