In this paper we consider different forms of intra-group transfers and the resulting type of group formation. We introduce the concept of partial joint liability and revenue sharing and show that this form of intra-group transfer may result in heterogeneous group formation. Its uniqueness is established by the fact that other transfer schemes always result in homogenous group formation.
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Paper provided by Monash University, Department of Economics in its series Monash Economics Working Papers with number
24/08.
Find related papers by JEL classification: O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Xavier Gine & Pamela Jakiela & Dean Karlan & Jonathan Morduch, 2006.
"Microfinance Games,"
Working Papers
2102, The Field Experiments Website.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Dean Karlan & Xavier Gine & Jonathan Morduch & Pamela Jakiela, 2006.
"Microfinance Games,"
Working Papers
936, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
[Downloadable!]