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Mises, Hayek and Corruption

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  • Tomas Otahal

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics, Mendel University in Brno)

Abstract

Using the arguments of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August von Hayek, I argue that private ownership solves the economic problem of corruption. Since private ownership discourages entrepreneurs from rent-seeking, and privately owned media provide objective and unbiased information to citizens, any legal reform establishing and enforcement of private ownership also solves the corruption problem.

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File URL: ftp://ftp.mendelu.cz/RePEc/men/wpaper/34_2013.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics in its series MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics with number 2013-34.

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Length: 15
Date of creation: Mar 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:men:wpaper:34_2013

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Keywords: Austrian school; corruption; economic calculation; rent-seeking;

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  1. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 503-30, May.
  2. Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, 2007. "Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1020-1048, December.
  3. Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2009. "Infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns: The roots of public discontent," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 69-84, September.
  4. Enrico Colombatto, 2003. "Why is Corruption Tolerated?," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 363-379, December.
  5. Tomáš Otáhal, 2007. "Why Is Corruption a Problem of the State?," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2007(2), pages 165-179.
  6. Cuneyt Koyuncu & Harun Ozturkler & Rasim Yilmaz, 2010. "Privatization and corruption in transition economies: a panel study," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(3), pages 277-284.
  7. Jakob Svensson, 2005. "Eight Questions about Corruption," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 19-42, Summer.
  8. Simeon Djankov & Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The New Comparative Economics," NBER Working Papers 9608, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Peter T. Leeson, 2008. "Media Freedom, Political Knowledge, and Participation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 155-169, Spring.
  10. Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 2004. "The Economics of Repeated Extortion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 203-223, Summer.
  11. Gordon Tullock, 1996. "Corruption Theory And Practice," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 6-13, 07.
  12. Clarke, George R. G. & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2004. "Privatization, competition, and corruption: how characteristics of bribe takers and payers affect bribes to utilities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 2067-2097, August.
  13. Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "A free press is bad news for corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August.
  14. Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Soreide, Tina, 2005. "Corruption and privatization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 903-914, December.
  15. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
  16. Cuneyt Koyuncu & Harun Ozturkler & Rasim Yilmaz, 2010. "Privatization and corruption in transition economies: a panel study," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 13(3), pages 277-284.
  17. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
  18. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
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