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Volunteering To Be Taxed: Business Improvement Districts And The Extra-Governmental Provision Of Public Safety

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  • Leah Brooks

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Abstract

When the median voter's preference sets the level of local public goods, some voters are left unsatisfied. Is there an institution by which subsets of voters can resolve the collective action problem and increase the local provision of public goods? If so, what are the consequences? In response to problems such as crime and vandalism, neighborhood property owners have established Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) to provide local public goods. When a BID is approved by a majority of property owners in a neighborhood, state law makes contributions to the BID budget mandatory. This resolution of the neighborhood's collective action problem reduces crime - BIDs in the city of Los Angeles are robustly associated with crime declines of 5 to 9 percent. Indeed, crime falls regardless of estimation technique: fixed effects; comparing BIDs to neighborhoods that considered, but did not adopt, BIDs; using propensity score matching; and comparing BIDs to their neighbors. Strikingly, these declines are purchased cheaply. Attributing all BID expenditure to violent crime reduction, and thus ignoring the impact of BID expenditure on many quality-of-life crimes, BIDs spend $21,000 to avert one violent crime. This higher bound estimate is substantially lower than the $57,000 social cost of a violent crime.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by McGill University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 2006-04.

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Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mcl:mclwop:2006-04

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  1. Grogger, Jeffrey, 2002. "The Effects of Civil Gang Injunctions on Reported Violent Crime: Evidence from Los Angeles County," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 69-90, April.
  2. Brooks, Leah, 2007. "Unveiling Hidden Districts: Assessing the Adoption Patterns of Business Improvement Districts in California," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 60(1), pages 5-24, March Cit.
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Cited by:
  1. Catalina Gómez Toro & Hermilson Velásquez & Joaquín Andrés Urrego & Juan David Valderrama, 2014. "Efecto de los Ingresos Permanentes sobre el Delito: Un Enfoque Espacial y un Caso de Aplicación," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO CIEF 010900, UNIVERSIDAD EAFIT.
  2. Philip J. Cook & John MacDonald, 2010. "The Role of Private Action in Controlling Crime," NBER Chapters, in: Controlling Crime: Strategies and Tradeoffs, pages 331-363 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Brooks, Leah, 2007. "Unveiling Hidden Districts: Assessing the Adoption Patterns of Business Improvement Districts in California," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 60(1), pages 5-24, March Cit.
  4. Brooks, Leah & Strange, William C., 2011. "The micro-empirics of collective action: The case of business improvement districts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1358-1372.
  5. Meltzer, Rachel, 2011. "“Clean And Safe” For All? The Interaction Betweeen Business Improvement Districts And Local Government In The Provision Of Public Goods," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 64(3), pages 863-89, September.
  6. Miller, Mark V., 2013. "Valuing local collective goods: the case of business improvement districts," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 150635, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  7. Edward L. Glaeser, 2012. "Urban Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 18244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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