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Contracts, Externalities, and Incentives in Shopping Malls

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Author Info
Eric D. Gould (Hebrew University, CEPR, and IZA)
B. Peter Pashigian (Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago)
Canice J. Prendergast (Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago)

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Abstract

This paper demonstrates that mall store contracts are written to internalize externalities through both an efficient allocation and pricing of space, and an efficient allocation of incentives across stores. Certain stores generate externalities by drawing customers to other stores, whereas many stores primarily benefit from external mall traffic. Therefore, to varying degrees, the success of each store depends upon the presence and effort of other stores, and the effort of the developer to attract customers to the mall. Using a unique data set of mall tenant contracts, we show that rental contracts are written to (i) efficiently price the net externality of each store and (ii) align the incentives to induce optimal effort by the developer and each mall store according to the externality of each store's effort. Copyright (c) 2005 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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File URL: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/0034653054638355
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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Review of Economics and Statistics.

Volume (Year): 87 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
Pages: 411-422
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:87:y:2005:i:3:p:411-422

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Cheung, Steven N S, 1969. "Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 23-42, April.
  2. Pashigian, B Peter & Gould, Eric D, 1998. "Internalizing Externalities: The Pricing of Space in Shopping Malls," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 115-42, April.
  3. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2), pages 219-55, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Edward P. Lazear, 2000. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Asher Wolinsky, 1983. "Retail Trade Concentration Due to Consumers' Imperfect Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 275-282, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Brueckner, Jan K, 1993. "Inter-store Externalities and Space Allocation in Shopping Centers," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 5-16, July.
  7. Rauch, James E, 1993. "Does History Matter Only When It Matters Little? The Case of City-Industry Location," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(3), pages 843-67, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Benjamin, John D. & Boyle, Glenn W. & Sirmans, C. F., 1992. "Price discrimination in shopping center leases," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 299-317, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 1999. "The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 1041-1080, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. John D. Benjamin & Glenn W. Boyle & C. F. Sirmans, 1990. "Retail Leasing: The Determinants of Shopping Center Rents," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 18(3), pages 302-312. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1987. "Competition for Agency Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 296-307, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Leah Brooks, 2006. "Unveiling Hidden Districts: Assessing The Adoption Patterns Of Business Improvement Districts In California," Departmental Working Papers 2006-03, McGill University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mingchun Sun & Edison Tse, 2007. "When Does the Winner Take All in Two-Sided Markets?," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 6(1), pages 16-41, March. [Downloadable!]
  3. Emek Basker, 2003. "Job Creation or Destruction? Labor-Market Effects of Wal-Mart Expansion," Labor and Demography 0303002, EconWPA, revised 11 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Leah Brooks, 2006. "Volunteering To Be Taxed: Business Improvement Districts And The Extra-Governmental Provision Of Public Safety," Departmental Working Papers 2006-04, McGill University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Catherine Tucker & Juanjuan Zhang, 2008. "Decomposing the Congestion Effect and the Cross-Platform Effect in Two-Sided Networks: A Field Experiment," Working Papers 08-12, NET Institute, revised Oct 2008. [Downloadable!]
  6. Raffaella Sadun, 2008. "Does Planning Regulation Protect Independent Retailers?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0888, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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