Explicating Corruption and Tax Evasion:Reflections on Greek Tragedy
AbstractDo developed countries experience extensive corruption and if so how should they treat it? Evidence from countries in which tax evasion and various forms of corruption coexist and interact (e.g. Greece) indicates that the answer is positive. We address this problem by constructing an overlapping generations model com- prising two distinct groups of agents, citizens and politicians. Citizens decide the fraction of their income that they report to the tax authorities. Politicians decide the fraction of the public budget that they peculate. In such a context, multiple self-ful?lling equilibria can emerge: a "good"("bad") equilibrium with low (high) corruption and high (low) level of spending on education. It is shown that standard deterrence policies (e.g., fines) cannot eliminate multiplicity. Interestingly, whenever corruption may corrupt, policies that impose a strong moral cost on tax evaders and corrupt politicians can lead to a unique equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Macedonia in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 2011_07.
Date of creation: May 2011
Date of revision: May 2011
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Web page: http://www.uom.gr/index.php?tmima=3
Corruption; Tax Evasion; Multiple Equilibria; Stigma.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2011-05-24 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2011-05-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2011-05-24 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-POL-2011-05-24 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2011-05-24 (Public Finance)
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