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Losers and Losers: Some Demographics of Medical Malpractice Tort Reforms

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Abstract

Our research examines individual differences in the effects of medical malpractice tort reforms on pre-trial settlement speed and settlement amounts by age and most likely settlement size. Findings of note include that, unlike previously assumed, both absolute and percentage losses from tort reform are small for infants in an asset value sense and that the prime-aged working population is the group most negatively affected by tort reform. Maximum entropy quantile regressions highlight the robustness of our conclusions and reveal that the settlement losses most informative for policy evaluation differ greatly from mean regression estimates. Key Words: Medical Malpractice, Tort Reform, Texas Closed Claims, Damage Caps, Quantile Regression, Maximum Entropy JEL No. I 11, C 21

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Paper provided by Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University in its series Center for Policy Research Working Papers with number 132.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2011
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Handle: RePEc:max:cprwps:132

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