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On the optimality of the full cost pricing

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Author Info
Jacques Thépot () (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université Louis Pasteur)
Jean-Luc Netzer

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Abstract

Most companies prefer to use absorption costing rule rather than marginal cost pricing. This article is aimed at defining the absorption costing rule as deriving from a principal-agent formulation of two tier organizations : (i) the upstream unit fixes the production capacity and uses it as a cost driver to compute the average cost (ii) the downstream unit operates on the market and chooses the output level on the basis of the average cost. Absorption costing results in two policies to be used according to the magnitude of the fixed cost. When the fixed cost is low, the capacity is fully used and a full cost pricing policy holds; when the fixed cost is high, a partial cost pricing policy holds since only a part of the fixed cost is passed on. The absorption costing rule competes with three pricing rules related to this two-tier structure and various payoffs functions associated to the decision levels: the separation, the tranfer pricing and the integration These rules are analyzed in the Cournot oligopoly case and comparisons in terms of profits are made. Except in the monopoly case, there exists a wide range of values of the fixed cost, for which the full cost pricing dominates all the other rules. In addition, there exists a specific value of the fixed cost for which the full cost pricing duplicates the monopoly and then leads to the first best solution of the Cournot oligopoly.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université de Strasbourg (France) in its series Working Papers of LaRGE (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) with number 2007-05.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:lar:wpaper:2007-05

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Related research
Keywords: Full cost pricing; imperfect competition.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 1-37, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Greenhut, M L & Ohta, H, 1979. "Vertical Integration of Successive Oligopolists," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 137-41, March.
  3. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(3), pages 257-65, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 38-56, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Abiru, Masahiro & Nahata, Babu & Raychaudhuri, Subhashis & Waterson, Michael, 1998. "Equilibrium structures in vertical oligopoly," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 463-480, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 347. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Thepot, Jacques, 1995. "Bertrand oligopoly with decreasing returns to scale," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 689-718. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Laixun Zhao, 2000. "Decentralization and Transfer Pricing Under Oligopoly," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 414-426, July.
  9. Lin, Y Joseph, 1988. "Oligopoly and Vertical Integration: Note," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 251-54, March.
  10. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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