Endogenous industry structure in vertical duopoly
AbstractThis paper examines integration decisions of successive duopolists. It is shown that qualitatively the same pattern of integration emerges whether there is Cournot or Bertrand competition in the input market. The degree of integration in the industry is increasing in the size of the downstream market and decreasing in the average marginal cost of the industry and in the fixed integration cost. There jis a tendency for partial integration when one upstream firm is relatively efficient compared to its rival.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library in its series LSE Research Online Documents on Economics with number 6776.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Jul 1994
Date of revision:
endogenous industry structure; vertical duopoly; integration; competition; market;
Other versions of this item:
- R14 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Land Use Patterns
- J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General
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