Do clubs foster provision success ?
AbstractWe report the results of an experiment on the provision of a step-level collective good. We compare subjects’ behavior in a public good game and in a club good game. In the club good game, players who contribute less than the amount required to become a member, do not benefit from the collective good. Compared to the benchmark step-level public good, we find that the introduction of a small membership fee has surprisingly strong effects. It increases significantly the provision success of the collective good.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Working Papers with number 09-19.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision: Dec 2009
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-12-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-12-19 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2009-12-19 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2009-12-19 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SPO-2009-12-19 (Sports & Economics)
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